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Evaluating Governance Programs 
Report of a workshop 
8 April 1999 
IDRC, Ottawa 
Introduction 
The goal of this one-day workshop was to exchange views from different perspectives on the 
monitoring and evaluation of externally funded governance programs. Participants included 
governance and evaluation practitioners, agency representatives, and academicians. The 
workshop sought to arrive at consensus on the practical and policy issues related to improving 
the implementation and reporting of governance interventions. 
The genesis of the workshop was a review of the Program on Governance (PoG) in South Africa, 
a support program funded by the Canadian government to assist the government of the Republic 
of South Africa. As this is the best documented Canadian experience in this field, it served as a 
solid point of departure for discussion. It was complemented by experiences in other countries 
and other types of governance interventions. 
This account of the meeting summarizes discussions around the key themes of the meeting and 
concludes with main areas of follow-up recognized at the workshop. 
The report includes 6 annexes. The first two presentations of the day, by Dean Stephen Toope 
and Dr Al Johnson are included, as these were referred to by participants throughout the day. A 
literature review was conducted for the workshop by Dr Ilan Kapoor (Annex 3). Annex 4 is the 
Annotated Agenda used by the workshop. A list of participants is appended as Annex 5. 
Finally, Annex 6 lists the documents received by participants before and during the workshop. 
1 
What are we trying to achieve when we put in place support for good 
governance programs? 
Definition 
1. It was clearly recognized by the workshop that sound and sustainable social and 
economic development is unattainable without good governance. Governance as a term is 
increasingly problematic as it is overused and has become vague in usage. It has some 
aspects of "flavour of the month" in development assistance, and because it is defined in 
broad terms, it tends to be defined according to the previous programming experience of 
participants. 
2. The workshop struggled with the definition of governance, recognizing its importance as 
a basis for determining what comprises a governance program and for how it is evaluated. 
While there was general agreement with the definition as stated in the annotated agenda 
of the meeting (Annex 4), and emerging from the work of the Institute on Governance 
(IoG), there was also a recognition that this definition is incomplete and does not offer a 
solid basis for designing governance interventions, or for assessing their performance. 
Governance comprises the institutions, processes and traditions which 
determine how power is exercised, how decisions are taken and how 
citizens have their say. 
3. The workshop reflected different perspectives on this definition. From one perspective it 
was noted that governance is simply the act of governing, and that this should be the 
working definition from which all governance programming activities are defined. For 
others, the IoG definition proved adequate, so long as several points were made clear: 
3.1 Governance programming is an expression of the Canadian foreign policy goal of 
supporting democratic development. This has become a central policy agenda for 
both the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). The workshop 
noted some contradictions in the application of this foreign policy agenda to 
governance programming: 
a) in the support of governance programming in authoritarian states; 
b) in assisting NGOs to promote democratic development in an "unwilling" 
state; and 
c) in making judgements about how much democracy is "enough". 
3.2 This foreign policy agenda highlights one of the main challenges of governance 
programming: remaining cognizant of the values which underly the support 
provided to recipients. It was noted that the definition of governance is weakened 
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if the values which guide governance programming are not explicit. Participants 
referred to this as a normative gap between some of the models of governance 
work and the norms which inform them. 
3.3 That governance programming relates not only to the government sector, but also 
to civil society and the private sector should be explicit. Initiatives may have an 
emphasis in one sector or another, but should be cognizant of all sectors. Good 
governance is unlikely to emerge when one sector is developed to the detriment of 
others. 
4. For still others, the definition of governance needed to be much more specific about the 
role and focus for the private sector and civil society. The following points were made: 
4.1 Governance programming and evaluation to date has tended to be quite narrow. It 
has tended to focus primarily on public sector management and performance, 
thereby ignoring the role and contributions of civil society in a country's 
governance. And even within the public sector, emphasis has tended to be placed 
primarily on its effectiveness and efficiency (economic and institutional criteria), 
not on its legitimacy and accountability (political criteria). 
4.2 Reference was made in the discussion to a more detailed definition of governance 
programming, such as that used by UNDP: 
Governance is the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in 
the management of a country's affairs at all levels. Governance comprises the 
complex mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and 
groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal 
rights and obligations... Governance includes the state, but transcends it by 
taking in the private sector and civil society. All these are critical... the state 
creates a conducive political and legal environment. The private sector generates 
jobs and income. And civil societyfacilitates political and social interaction - 
mobilizing groups to participate in economic, social and political activities... 
governance can no longer be considered a closed system. (Governance for 
Sustainable Human Development, a UNDP Policy document, January 1997.) 
5. The workshop agreed that the purpose of governance programming in the end is to 
strengthen institutional capacities to govern, leading to more effective policies and 
services in an increasingly democratic environment. 
6. The workshop did not reach a consensus on the definition of governance and governance 
programming. The broad character of the definition is reinforced in the point made in the 
workshop that virtually all development activities could be assessed for their influence on 
governance. These considerations reinforce the central importance of clarity in the 
criteria defining_2overnance interventions. 
3 
Characteristics 
7. The workshop noted that ownership of the governance program by the recipients is a sine 
qua non condition before any change can be institutionalized. By ownership is meant 
client consent and control of governance programming. The issue here is one of clarity of 
roles in governance programming: the role of foreign advisors needs to remain precisely 
advisory. In the case of the workshop itself, participation by recipients would have 
enhanced and enriched discussions. In view of these points, suggestions were put forth 
on the need for a recipient forum. 
8. It was recognized that donor interventions are both modest and only a part of a larger 
change being carried out in any society. It is therefore recommended that governance 
programs have modest expectations of their achievements in this field. 
9. Although the definition of governance remains elusive, the PoG reflects the key 
characteristics of successful governance initiatives. These characteristics were 
supplemented by the discussions to encompass the following: 
9.1 Ownership and commitment in the recipient country can be clearly recognized 
both at the top of the system and at the level of the intervention. 
9.2 There is a realistic commitment of time and resources by both the donor and the 
recipient to the defined task. 
9.3 The stature and expertise of the Canadians providing support through the project 
is key. 
9.4 The project team is responsive to emerging needs. 
9.5 There is strong (and ongoing) understanding of the context in which work is 
carried out; this includes a respect for existing governance norms in a society. 
9.6 A focus on "Key people - Key places - Key processes", permits one to identify 
critical issues and critical actors in order to meet the goals of the project; influence 
is a key tool in this regard. 
9.7 There is a compatibility between partners, that is among the recipients and 
advisors in any governance intervention. The level of compatibility will 
determine the direction and level of success. 
9.8 Good governance programs foster practitioner exchange and mentoring. 
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10. Indicators used to assess governance interventions became an important subject of 
discussion. The discussion can be characterized in the current debate between: 
10.1 the use of the fungibility of money (see the 1998 David Dollar report for the 
World Bank on "Assessing Aid"), as the principle indicator of good governance. 
Fungibility is increasingly proposed as the key decision factor in whether or not to 
support a regime; and 
10.2 the view that it is possible to identify islands of efficiency within a corrupt 
regime. These islands of efficiency may emerge as key building blocks in the 
reform of that system. 
11. For some participants, the essence of technical assistance in good governance is found in 
improving practice within existing systems. For others, effective technical assistance 
implies influencing the structures of government. 
12. While many governments are only beginning to develop a capacity for making 
incremental changes, they are feeling pressured by globalization to make sweeping 
changes. Aside from the bilateral influences in governance support, there are an 
increasing number of supranational agencies affecting governance. Increasing social and 
economic pressures are also important. This confluence of factors was compared with the 
period of the Marshall Plan, following the Second World War. At this time major 
institutions such as the OECD, the UN family and the European Community were 
created, and the Allies profoundly influenced governance aspects of reconstruction in 
Japan and Germany. While some important factors of success in the Marshall Plan were 
highlighted in the discussion (such as the sustained nature of the intervention and the fact 
that it was clear who were the winners and losers), it was noted that a serious look at the 
factors behind the success of the Marshall Plan, from a governance perspective, could 
give many insights into what needs to be done now. 
13. These points on the definition and characteristics of governance programming highlight 
the conclusion that there is no one model of "good governance", nor of governance 
programming. Hence, there can be no single model of governance evaluation. Good 
governance is affected by geography, politics, culture and economy. The workshop 
insisted that the key, is being clear on the context. the goals and the players. before 
constructing an intervention or an evaluation. 
5 
How can the various actors know if and why they are moving towards the 
results they want? 
14. The notion of causality in governance programming was rejected; there are too many 
variables at play. Evaluation of governance work is not scientific per se. It must 
nevertheless be rigorous and make use of data to reach conclusions or to support the 
initiative. Good practitioners periodically assess the activities for which they are 
responsible, to evaluate whether or not the program is on the right track, or how a 
particular approach/intervention might be refined. 
15. Governance as a whole cannot be evaluated by outsiders as outsiders cannot credibly 
evaluate the government of a country. Ways must therefore be found to identify the 
level at which evaluation of governance can take place. It was suggested that this task is 
best achieved in cooperation with those governing and being governed. 
16. A revolution in thinking affects governance programming: a metaphor which resonated 
with the participants was that instead of thinking of programming in the traditional 
ballistic missile sense of "ready-aim-fire" programming in governance needs to be 
thought of from the more complex and cybernetic perspective of the cruise missile: 
"ready-fire-aim-aim." This means that evaluation must have the capacity to monitor 
adjustments and changes in direction over time. Just as governments can no longer 
manage change incrementally, but must take account of pressures imposed by sweeping 
global changes, evaluation cannot monitor progress along a simple baseline, because the 
ground keeps shifting. 
17. Most participants felt that the work which has been done to date in governance 
programming is ripe for evaluation. A significant number of initiatives have been 
undertaken in the field of governance and many experiments have been initiated both 
domestically and internationally. A new generation of work in this field is about to be 
undertaken. Therefore, research and evaluation on what has been achieved would be 
useful inputs to planning this new generation of activities. Evaluation should look at 
three things: 
17.1 what worked, and why; 
17.2 what didn't work, and why not; and 
17.3 the unintended consequences of our activities. 
(In an example cited to the workshop, from an apparently successful project in 
Guatemala to support the development of indigenous peasant coops throughout 
the 1970s, all was destroyed during the military repression of the early 1980s.) 
18. The policy objectives of governance programming are clear - to support increasingly 
effective government in emerging democracies - but not enough is known about the what 
6 
and the how of doing it, and this could be effectively assisted by research and evaluation. 
19. Evaluation does not stand alone in a review of governance programs. It was noted that 
governance work is frequently highly political in nature. It therefore requires ongoing 
commitment and recognition of its importance by the relevant governing bodies in both 
the recipient and donor countries. 
20. The workshop repeatedly emphasized the need for a strategic direction to a governance 
program, even though factors such as the politics of governance, and the necessity for 
openness and flexibility at the programmatic level, mean that you cannot pre-determine 
the course. This strategic direction is key to the evaluation of governance programming 
and sets the context within which to evaluate the strategies adopted. It was prop so ed to 
the meeting that as a management and learning tool, evaluation should be seen as a way 
to negotiate different versions of reality and thereby improve our approximate 
knowledge. 
What are the strengths and weaknesses of existing mechanisms for generating 
and applying this knowledge? 
From technocratic evaluation to learning-based evaluation 
21. Historically, evaluation has been technocratic in application. That is, it has been a set of 
tools narrowly applied by experts, without necessarily serving the needs of the 
participants. The primary client was always the funding agency, which sought to know if 
the program it funded was "good" or not. Throughout the day, discussion returned to the 
point that there is a need to acknowledge up-front the value-ladenness and political nature 
of evaluation, and of governance evaluation in particular. This stems from the multiple 
and differing interests (socio-economic, cultural, moral) of the various partners and 
clients involved in any governance program or evaluation. The failure to acknowledge 
and incorporate this value-laden and political dimension into evaluation is what has led to 
the "blueprint" and "technocratic" approaches of the past, in which the inflexible models 
and priorities of some clients (usually the donors) have been imposed on all the others. 
22. There was widespread agreement in the workshop that technocratic approaches are not 
useful in the evaluation of governance programming and that there is a need to develop 
new ways to evaluate which are more oriented to learning. There is a danger in the 
systematization of knowledge, and the creation of information systems, which can take a 
good idea and compartmentalize the data to the point it is no longer useful (good ideas 
put in systems often produce idiocy). In these earlier technocratic systems, there were no 
incentives, such as placing a high value on applying learning. The trend to learning 
through evaluation was highlighted in two discussions in the workshop, one on 
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participation (paragraph 23) and one on the application of tools (paragraphs 24 & 25). 
23. The literature review by Dr Kapoor opened a rich debate on participatory evaluation and 
its potential in assessing progress in governance programming. Participation means the 
introduction of diverse perspectives and needs which have to be managed. For some at 
the workshop, participation in evaluation by the stakeholders was crucial to ownership 
(client consent and control) and use of the results of evaluation. A note of caution was 
also raised however: a key ingredient of participation is the equitability of power between 
groups/partners; it is the absence of such equitability that causes the risk of reinforcing a 
bias in the evaluation towards the special interests of some groups, rather than permitting 
a more objective overview of the activity. For others, participation made the evaluation 
more honest. For example, in the recent Rwanda evaluation and the Sahel evaluation 
undertaken within the OECD, the only way for the range of participants involved to 
protect their reputations was to be quite open and direct in their description and 
interpretation of events. 
24. Consistent with this perspective, the workshop observed that while evaluation can operate 
as a disciplined criticism of an activity, it runs the risk of becoming a screen between the 
project and reality when performance criteria are set without adequate knowledge of the 
circumstances being addressed. Traditional evaluation approaches which demand the 
application of the same tool and logic model to all initiatives were rejected as irrelevant 
and possibly destructive. It was also noted that some of the evaluation tools in use today 
(such as Logical Framework Analysis - LFA, Results Based Management - RBM, and 
Indicators-based studies) were developed with a different purpose, primarily the 
evaluation of discrete, blueprint-type projects (i.e., infrastructure projects) and have little 
fit with complex and iterative, governance program agendas. 
25. The workshop was also reminded that the tools are not the problem. Rather the 
application of these tools must be modified to meet diverse and complex needs and they 
must be customized in different settings. Examples of some attempts which have been 
made to use the LFA and other tools in a manner more consistent with the needs of 
governance programming were raised. However, the application of these tools through 
RBM appears to contradict this move to a more iterative and flexible approach to the use 
of LFA and other tools and has resulted in a more rigid form of LFA. 
26. One of the challenges for donor evaluations will be not only to move towards the 
acceptance of supplementing quantitative with qualitative information, but also accepting 
and relying on personal stories and narrative accounts of clientsibeneficiaries. Part of the 
challenge here is moving away from the mind set of only accepting as authoritative 
numeric data and the so-called "objective" and "impersonal" assessments of the 
evaluator(s). Another challenge will be making the presence/absence (or the 
institutionalization) of "learning" and "participation" in governance activities itself a 
criteria for evaluations, so that projects are made accountable not just to results but to 
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what has been learned and who has participated in that learning process. 
The importance of criteria and clarity of purpose 
27. The selection of criteria for evaluation was presented as crucial to the definition of new 
approaches to governance evaluation. While most agencies and people in the governance 
field tend to list many of the same general criteria, there is insufficient attention paid to 
ensuring coherence and consistency between donors and recipients in understanding how 
these criteria apply in each setting. This was reinforced in the description of PoG's 
success in terms of its persistence, ongoing field presence and the flexibility of its key 
staff. Evaluation criteria have to be considered in each case by the recipients in 
partnership with those providing technical assistance. Unless that clarity is sought, the 
evaluator determines the criteria independently and, as noted by Dean Toope in his 
opening remarks, wields enormous influence far beyond the scope of evaluation. This 
aspect of the discussion was related by the workshop quite closely to the issue of tools 
noted in paragraphs 24 & 25 above. Without a clear sense of criteria the data collection 
tools are often inappropriately applied. 
28. In his summary, Dr Armstrong stressed the importance of criteria for good governance. 
First, in terms of the activities and programs to foster good governance (courses, 
mentoring, publication, etc.), there is already a clear understanding of the nature and 
focus of these activities. A number of tools and methods exist for evaluating the quality 
and success of activities. Second, in terms of the assessment of the institutions and 
processes supporting good governance (legislatures, judiciaries, financial accountability, 
service delivery mechanisms, etc.), the nature and importance of institutional capacity 
building is clear, and tools are in place for assessment in this dimension. A third element 
of importance in governance programs is the relationships to ensure synergy and 
sustainability (central and local government, inter-institutional relations, civil society 
organizations, network support, etc.). In this domain, as well, tools for evaluating 
networks and partnerships exist. Further, there is a clear understanding of their 
importance and their relationships to both the development of institutional capacities, and 
the delivery of successful activities. The fourth and final element of governance projects 
proposed, is that of the criteria for good governance. Here, there is more uncertainty. 
The terms used to describe the criteria (for example, transparency, accountability, rule of 
law, participation, level of corruption, etc.), have a particular meaning in the Canadian 
context, well understood by Canadians. Therefore, these words have been used quite 
casually in the design of governance initiatives, forgetting that the application of these 
terms in a new environment has to deal with the embedded values, history and the 
capacities of a system. Defining these criteria therefore would entail a dialogue between 
donor and recipient, and a clear understanding of the context in which program delivery 
is to take place. This framework for thinking about the major elements of a governance 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29. Throughout the day, the workshop reminded itself that some modesty is necessary in 
undertaking governance activities, as well as in their evaluation. It recognized that 
governance programming is not a smooth exercise, and can sometimes be wrought with 
contradictions. Coming to terms with this permits governance programming and 
evaluations to set modest, realistic and flexible objectives; failure to do so can lead to 
unrealistic expectations and a breakdown in communication between partners. 
30. It was noted that Canada has not succeeded in institutionalizing an adequate level of 
evaluation of its own domestic governance initiatives. Therefore, the workshop stressed 
that prudence is needed in the standards set by one country for other countries. Some of 
the recipients who have been assisted through Canadian governance programs highly 
appreciate that assistance and have noted that they would like to give something back to 
Canada. This would be a useful confirmation of the innovations they have developed and 
be useful for Canada as well in dealing with our own challenges in this arena. 
31. While the workshop emphasized the need to use evaluation for learning, it also 
recognized the importance of the accountability function of evaluation. For some 
participants, these two were quite separate functions and activities. For others, learning 
was paramount and accountability was left to the internal reporting function; for others 
learning and accountability are intertwined in good management. The workshop did not 
see evaluation as a policing tool, but rather as a tool for dialogue among the interests and 
for learning, both of which need to be better articulated in the design and conduct of 
evaluations- particularly at the project design stage. 
32. The issue of evaluation is a complex one. The example was raised of the Norwegian 
approach to evaluating governance programs. In order to address the complexity of the 
program and build a solid knowledge base for evaluation, teams are used. The teams are 
sent to the field for up to six months to develop an in-depth knowledge of the program 
and the context. While this approach was seen as laudable, the workshop noted that 
Canada cannot afford this approach in most of its work. However, within the OECD, 
there is an increasing trend to collaborative evaluation by several member states of their 
interventions in the governance field. Through participation in these joint undertakings. 
Canada could gain some of the advantages of a more in-depth approach and could also 
contribute to strengthening governance evaluations across the OECD system, 
Next steps 
33. It was concluded that the need for rigorous reflection on the performance of governance 
programming is clear. Tools and methods need to be developed quickly in consultation 
with the key clients. Four concrete activities were suggested: 
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33.1 To establish a forum for discussion of governance programming among 
practitioners. IDRC was suggested as an appropriate founder of such a forum. 
33.2 To create a forum which draws on the perspectives of recipients of governance 
assistance. This could be considered by Programs Branch at IDRC. 
33.3 To build links with IDRC and its partners' work in the area of peace and 
conflict impact assessment (PCIA) was also recommended. 
33.4 An inventory of relevant literature and studies would be a useful source of 
lessons learned for practitioners and evaluators in this field. 
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Annex 1 
Evaluating Governance Programs 
8 April 1999 
Opening Remarks 
Dean Stephen Toope 
Introduction 
I would like to thanks the President for organizing this workshop and for inviting me to make 
some initial comments. 
This morning I will open the session by reviewing five main points which are central to the 
workshop: 
What is governance? 
Does evaluation in governance programming matter? 
What are the criteria for evaluation? 
What are there preconditions for effectiveness? 
Who benefits from, and who participates in, evaluation? 
What is governance? 
Is governance the flavour of the month in development circles? Yes, it is partly a fad in 
development - more and more work is defined in terms of governance. But is also reflects a 
reality that sound development probably is not possible, and certainly is not sustainable, without 
good governance. The case of the Asian Tigers, especially Thailand, illustrates this point well. 
Is it important how we define governance? The definition matters because it ensures 
commonality of theme and clarity in our work. It also conditions appropriate criteria for 
evaluation. We are starting with the IOG (Institute on Governance) definition of governance: 
Governance comprises the institutions, processes and traditions which determine 
how power is exercised, how decisions are taken and how citizens have their say. 
This definition gives us a good starting point. However, three points remain unanswered: 
I. If it is true that you cannot evaluate overall governance (i.e., Has our initiative improved 
the governance of South Africa?) it may also be true that it is difficult to evaluate 
components of the overall governance framework. This is related to the issue of 
assessing - or even positing - causality, an issue to which I will return later. 
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2. What sectors are involved in governance? Are we interested in governance only with 
the public sector? How do organs of civil society - and even private sector actors - 
affect our evaluation of good governance? Consider, for example, the case of anti- 
corruption initiatives. Corruption is ingrained in the private sector in some countries 
(such as Korea). And we cannot institute effective anti-corruption measures in the 
public sector if we do not address the issue with the private sector as well. 
3. What does it mean to say that governance is a "cross cutting theme"? The two main 
points would appear to be that it is relevant to all sectors; and that it should form part of 
all efforts at evaluation, not only for "governance programs". 
Does evaluation in governance programming matter? 
I am inclined to agree with the CIDA results-based management framework on this point, where it 
is argued that the more appropriate concept is "monitoring", not evaluation. This is only partly a 
semantic issue - participatory evaluation is related closely to the idea of monitoring, which is 
about learning lessons during a project and adjusting accordingly. 
The issue of the relationship between monitoring and evaluation is addressed in the literature 
review prepared by Dr Kapoor with its emphasis on participatory evaluation in governance 
programming. This approach cuts across both monitoring and evaluation. In order to answer the 
question about the relevance of evaluation, we have to ask ourselves the central question for the 
workshop: What are the goals of the evaluation of governance programming? 
Historically, evaluation has been a technocratic activity focussed on developing a more effective 
and efficient management system. As such, it is based on rationalist assumptions. And if we base 
our work on rationalist assumptions, then we need to establish causality. But the world doesn't 
work that way and there is an ongoing struggle with issues of causality in the social sciences. 
Evaluation is also defined around different levels of effects of an activity. We can focus at the 
level of outputs, such as in the New Zealand model. Or we can focus on outcomes and results, or 
even at the level of the impacts of our activities. Professor Sutherland, in her report on the 
Program on Governance in South Africa, cautions against evaluation of results and impact. 
A rationalist, scientific model is committed to an assessment of causality (intervention A leads to 
result B). Professor Sutherland correctly asks whether there is any reality to this approach if we 
recognize that social science cannot posit any laws of social behaviour, much less identify precise 
social causation. 
This leaves us with a combination of data assessment and narrative. Inevitably these approaches 
are value-loaded: we can ask whether a project "promotes" human rights, or "fosters" citizen 
participation. This, of course, highlights the key issue of the role of "Canadian" values in our 
assessment. 
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The weakest, or least judgmental, form of evaluation is the stakeholder assessment of change, 
which is fully participatory. It is said to foster mutual learning and empowerment. These are 
admirable goals - but how real is this approach given the reality of continuing power imbalances 
notably in fonder-recipient relationships? Are funders willing to accept purely "formative" 
evaluation, or is there a judgment day? Are we going to say in the end, "This is all well and good 
Mr Mbeki, but IDRC and CIDA are accountable to the Canadian taxpayer." 
Establishing criteria for evaluation 
A wide range of criteria for evaluating governance programs are posited by various authors and 
organizations. All of these different sets of criteria are affected by underlying assumptions about 
what governance is and who and what is being measured. 
The OECD defines its evaluation of governance programs in terms of: 
Improved decision-making; 
Improved resource allocation; and 
Improved accountability. 
The OECD Group on Participatory Development and Good Governance, as well as Dr Kapoor, 
add the notion of: 
Transparency; and 
Dr Kapoor also adds the notion of- 
9 Efficiency. 
Both Treasury Board and Professor Sutherland add: 
Relevance to actual need; and 
Appropriate method/cost effect. 
And CIDA and Professor Sutherland add the notions of- 
Sustainability; 
Partnership approach; 
Creativity or innovation; and 
Leveraging other commitments. 
Interestingly, there is very little talk thus far about other possible measures, such as: 
Effectiveness 
Democratic participation. 
What we are left with from this survey of evaluation criteria is that there is neither coherence nor 
agreement on appropriate criteria for the evaluation of governance programming. Perhaps 
Professor Sutherland is correct in saying that you have to choose criteria specific to each case. 
The problem with this approach is that evaluator then wields enormous influence far beyond what 
s/he should wield in programming decisions. This approach also further undercuts any claim to a 
"scientific" approach to evaluation in this field. Our theory is embedded in our assumptions. 
15 
Preconditions for effectiveness (or at least outputs) 
To evaluate governance programs, we need to look at their outputs. An important aspect of this is 
to understand the preconditions for achieving these outputs. Professor Kapoor notes that a central 
precondition for achieving outputs is realistic goal setting and clarity in those goals: in other 
words, we should not posit enormous effects from modest initiatives. I would like to propose the 
following additional criteria: 
Ownership and commitment (i.e., the demand for change) are central. 
There has to be political commitment to change. 
There has to be a realistic commitment of resources matched against objectives. 
There has to be a realistic and appropriate time commitment. 
Is there anything special which Canada has to offer? (For example, on of the South 
Africans interviewed by Professor Sutherland noted that there was too much emphasis on 
Canadian federalism vs. Indian, or other developing world, models of federalism.) 
Who benefits from and who participates in evaluation? 
To date, we have not been very clear on what we mean by partnership. We mix all kinds of it 
together in definition and assessment. Is it everyone with whom you work? Is it everyone you 
fund? What is the difference between a partner and a "stakeholder"? Many different people and 
groups are stakeholders (a term I don't like), but they have very different interests and needs, and 
certainly not all of them are partners. Or is partnership only those individuals and groups that 
have developed shared objectives and some mutuality of learning? This takes us back to the 
discussion of partnership led by CCIC (Canadian Council for International Cooperation) of 
roughly seven years ago. 
Other questions we should be clear about include: 
In governance, is government inevitably the key partner? 
Will the appropriate partner depend in part on the CEA (Canadian Executing Agency)? 
Can you change a government structure through non-governmental linkages? 
Can a Canadian government organization partner with NGOs? 
And what then is the impact on their government-to-government relations? 
Conclusion: will we learn from evaluation of governance programs? 
Answering the questions posed in my remarks might not be possible through evaluation. But 
evaluation can give us insights on process issues in implementing successful governance projects. 
Evaluation might also be able to give us some vague guiding principles. But it almost certainly 
cannot give us the norms against which to shape or justify future practice. 
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Annex 2 
Evaluating Governance Programs 
8 April 1999 
Opening Remarks 
Dr Al W. Johnson 
A. Introduction 
1. I would like to thank the President for arranging this workshop. It is timely if for no 
other reason than that governance programs seemingly are becoming the flavour of the 
month. And given this proliferation, it is time the international assistance community 
paused to reflect on where and what and how governance programmes should be 
initiated and conducted. 
2. I am pleased, too, that the South Africa/Canada Program on Governance (PoG) has been 
chosen as the prime program to lead these reflections. There is, of course, a particular 
reason for this: it is a known Canadian Program that has reported and reflected upon the 
shaping and delivery of a governance program. We pay tribute to Professor Sharon 
Sutherland for her singular - and highly professional - role in preparing that report. 
3. So, we have before us the benefit of the story of the PoG in South Africa, and the benefit 
of an assessment of that Program by a large number of South African DMs, ADMs and 
Directors General (to use the Canadian vocabulary) who have worked with the PoG. In 
addition, we have the judgment of half a dozen leading Canadian public service 
practitioners who assisted the Program from time to time. 
4. Now, in this seminar, it is the turn of the deliverers of this and selected other 
governance programs, along with others who are responsible for international work 
where governance is an important element, to consider what can be learned from the 
experience to date of the South Africa/Canada Program on Governance. This review will 
be done, I hope, in the context of the larger questions of where, and what, and how 
governance programmes should be mounted. 
5. In my remarks, first what I won't do: 
I won't talk about the history or the content of the PoGs work - you have that in 
front of you. 
Nor will I seek to assess the contribution the PoG has made, and what we can learn 
from it: that will becoming later this afternoon 
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I will do four things: 
Speak briefly to the character and attributes of the program and how they affect the 
functioning of the PoG; 
Identify and speak to the six principles upon which the PoG has been based - these 
are related to the character of the programmes 
Then I will turn to the methodology the Program developed and employed in its 
many projects. More precisely, I will identify and speak to the "instruments" we 
selected for making available Canadian experience; 
Finally I will give one example of how these instruments were used in a particular 
project, what they contributed and how they were ordered to achieve optimum 
results over time. 
B. The Character of the South African /Canada Program on Governance. 
I begin with a few words on the essential character of the South Africa / Canada Program on 
Governance. 
1. First and foremost it is a program based upon influence, as can be seen from its 
objective - as I personally would put it : 
To assist an emerging democracy, led largely by people who had little or no experience 
in democratic governance, to develop institutions, public officials, and processes of 
government that will lead to effective policy making, and to the effective delivery of 
services within a democratic system. And to provide that assistance with the 
concurrence - indeed at the invitation of - the government agencies concerned. 
This assistance is not provided as part of a larger scheme, such as the governance 
programs of the OECD and the European Union (EU), designed as they are inter alia, to 
qualify or to certify applicants nations for membership in the EU - in respect of their 
governance capacities. There are, in short, no external incentives, or "conditions" which 
lend muscle to the advice Canadians may impart to South African officials. The 
Canadian advice, or references to the Canadian experience, must be persuasive because 
it is inherently sound, inherently beneficial, and because the Canadian officials come to 
inspire the confidence, and earn the trust of the South Africans, in the soundness of their 
experience, and their insights. And the Canadian practitioners must understand the 
South African culture of governance if they are to tailor their experience to South 
African needs. 
This is the essence of influence: a person's reputation for his/her knowledge, experience 
and insights, and his or her track record as a practitioner, is such that others are open to, 
indeed welcome, his/her advice, and are likely to respond to it. 
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Clearly, given the character of the PoG, the choice of Canadian practitioners is vital. 
2. The second characteristic of PoG is the size of the program, and the obvious need to 
position itself and its work in relation to the vast panoply of institutions and systems of 
government where assistance might be useful. There is also the need to determine the 
level at which PoG can most usefully contribute to the issues and problems confronting 
South Africa's government. 
On which crucial elements of government do you focus? The answer to that question 
depends on which South African agencies and senior officials seek out assistance from 
PoG; and it further depends on the capacities of the PoG people on the ground, or likely 
to be available to the Program, e.g., from the provinces. 
Well, you know of the roles we came to play: you have seen them in the report. Put 
briefly they include: 
Work on the functioning of the federal/multi-sphere system of government 
- the initial work on constitutional discussions 
- working with the FFC from the beginning 
- intergovernmental relations 
Parliament and the legislatures: after some familiarization sessions for the 
legislative assemblies early on we focussed upon one leading-edge project: namely 
public participation in Guateng 
Work in five provinces through the vehicle of twinning arrangements between 
Canadian and South African provinces - focussing on the Premier's Office and the 
Cabinet Office, and on Central agencies generally. 
Work with one national department - DPW 
Work on one of the important systems or process of government - specifically 
planning and budgeting 
Work with Public services - PSC 
- DPSA 
- Prov. Public services (twinned provinces) 
Even membership in a national Royal Commission on the institutions and processes 
of Government - an instructive effort! ! 
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C The Principles upon which the Program has been based 
We have identified six principles by which we are guided in managing the PoG. You will see, 
as I go through them, that all are designed not only to make available and assure to South 
Africa the best and most experienced Canadian practitioners, but also to focus our efforts on 
key areas of government (as I have described them) using the most effective instruments for 
"transferring the knowledge and experience of real life practitioners". 
1 Practitioner-to-Practitioner Approach 
Principle: 
The Program is founded upon practitioner-to practitioner exchanges. 
It seems clear to us that the most effective diagnosis of issues and problems - and the 
positing of alternative approaches to them - emerges from a comparison of experiences 
- even though the Canadian experience may be much more mature than the South 
African experience. By practitioners, I mean both the PoG practitioners on the ground 
and Canadian provincial officials working under the twinning arrangements. 
It is a matter of recognizing that "preaching and teaching" are not on. South African 
senior practitioners have their own unique experience in aspects of public life, and in 
trying to transform the public service of their country. Canadians need to know this and 
to factor it into the exposition of how we - in mature governments - do things. This is 
not an academic exercise. 
This principle is based on the recognition that practitioners speak the same language - or 
are quick to do so. Bonds of "kinship" that emerge from this "club" are a very necessary 
part of South Africans coming to seek out and to benefit from Canadian experience. 
2. Presence of PoG in South Africa 
Principle 
The Program depends upon, indeed demands, a continuing presence in South 
Africa. 
I mean two kinds of presence. The first kind is having senior Canadian practitioners on 
the ground in South Africa, people who are there continuously, over extended periods of 
time. This results in learning much more about South African issues and problems, and 
the institutions and processes where these issues arise. More, it is in this way that 
Canadians come to be recognized for their capacity - and are used. The continuing 
Canadian presence is manifested, too, in a different way, by the twinning arrangements 
between provinces. Even here, however, the continuity and the effectiveness of 
province-to-province exchanges are buttressed by PoG's presence on the ground. 
The second kind of presence is the "presence of the persons", engaged by PoG. Given 
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the level at which they are expected to operate, they must by their person and by their 
stature, born in no small measure of their experience, command the respect of senior 
South African public servants. 
3. Accessibility of Canadian Practitioners 
Principle 
"Accessibility" to Canadian practitioners and their experience, without artificial 
impediments to engaging the assistance of the PoG. 
Of course there are boundaries to any aid project, but a good governance program must 
be free to interpret its own boundaries, and to respond as things change. Otherwise the 
program becomes halting and hesitating in a manner that stultifies relationships from the 
South Africans' point of view. 
That is one of the reasons for engaging experienced DMs; and ADMs and DGs in 
governance programs: they can be trusted to exercise the same judgment and discretion 
that they have learned and exercised as top public servants in Canada. 
4. Key People/Key Places/Key Processes 
Principle 
The focus of the Program should be Key People/Key Places/Key Processes in the 
Government of South Africa. 
Manifestly Canada's influence will be greater if our projects have this focus. 
One must try to get the big picture right, in governance: 
- Key People must be supported in getting things right. 
- Key Places must be properly identified and organized and properly staffed to get 
things right. 
- Key Processes - like constitution building and planning and budgeting and 
intergovernmental relations - must get it right. 
Otherwise the effectiveness of everything else - of smaller, less obvious aspects of 
governance will suffer. 
Having said all this, giving donor assistance in these areas - being invited into them - is 
tricky and difficult. And on the other side, doing good work in smaller, less obvious 
aspects of governance is not to be dismissed. 
There is one major caveat: if the big picture of governance in any country is seriously 
deficient, whether by reason of incompetence, or corruption, or the violation of 
democratic constitutions or institutions, one is forced to go back to the fundamental 
questions I posed at the beginning: where and what and how governance programs 
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should be initiated. 
5. Responsiveness and Evolution 
Principle 
Any program on governance must be responsive to emerging issues, changing 
needs, shifts in the political agenda. 
The landscape is continuously shifting and the Program has to be flexible enough to 
respond to those changes. 
6. Character and Direction of the Program 
Principle 
Mentoring is an important element in developing the capacityfor provincial level 
management. 
Mentoring is especially important given the "on the job" nature of PoG and indeed of 
governance in South Africa. 
A Methodology: the seven principal instruments for delivering the PoG in 
South Africa 
1. Networking by PoG's Special Advisors in South Africa 
Developing / maintaining / broadening wide networks of contacts in South Africa 
and within Canada 
- a great many of them being senior public servants who have been involved in 
PoG projects; 
- officials who have become friends, and with whom wider discussions about 
South African political and governmental affairs have become possible; 
- simply knowledgeable friends or associates - from NGOs, universities, people 
engaged in other aid projects; and 
- officials in Embassies and High Commissions. 
I won't say more about networking: I am intimidated by the presence of one of 
Canada's greatest networkers - IDRC's Maureen O'Neil. 
2. Study visits to Canada 
Are an important part of most of our projects - but are most prevalent as a part of 
the province-to-province twinning arrangements; 
There are short initial visits to familiarize South Africans with a particular aspect of 
government (the target of a possible project, for example); 
Short visits are important, too, for the discussion of concepts underlying the 
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functioning of target areas of governance work; 
Still longer visits are several weeks to a couple of months, say, involving skills, 
transfer and mentoring. 
3. Diagnostic and assessment visits of Canadians to South Africa 
To familiarize the Canadian officials with the problems South African officials are 
confronting in the target areas of a project - or potential project. 
Diagnostic and assessment visits to recommend changes in processes or structures 
of government and management of these structures. 
4. Workshops 
Are an important tool for all the major projects - comparative constitutions earlier 
on; fiscal arrangements; planning and budgeting; intergovernmental relations; the 
central agencies of government - frequently as the starting point for a major project. 
Bring together top Canadian practitioners with top South Africans to discuss 
Canadian experience in an area where South Africans are experiencing problems 
and which they can discuss together. 
Are an effective vehicle for identifying and discussing central issues in the selected 
area of government and for the Canadians to discuss what works and what does not 
work in Canada. 
Workshops, particularly when held in Canada, and of course privately, seem to 
evoke the frankest and most penetrating discussions among South Africans 
themselves, of the problems and the issues bothering them -attesting to the trust 
that has developed between the South Africans and the Canadians involved. 
5. Presence in South Africa of Special Advisors in PoG 
These advisors are available as consultants on an intermittent or continuing basis, 
on such subjects as Cabinet Offices, Central Agencies, Planning and Budgeting, 
Intergovernmental Relations. 
6. Long duration assignment of Canadians to South Africa 
This is a part of the PoG's high priority projects such as planning and budgeting - 
having specific objectives and planned outputs. 
These assignments involve skills transfers, systems design, and general mentoring. 
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7. Participating in a South African Royal Commission on the functions, structures and 
processes of the national and provincial governments 
AW Johnson was a member of the Presidential Review Commission - one of three 
foreigners in a Commission of 16. 
The intention was to have foreigners on the Commission to bring their expertise to 
Commission studies and deliberations and to participate as full members of the 
Commission (UK, Canada, Sweden). 
In fact, both the design of the Commission's work program, and the formulation of 
recommendations was the work of the South Africans - despite the fact, for 
example, that Al W Johnson was chosen as the Supervising Commissioner in 
respect of planning and budgeting. The same was the case for other Supervising 
Commissioners, black or white. In the end, this had to be so: the Commission was a 
South African Commission. 
The other side of the coin is that PoG did contribute materially to the 
recommendations on planning and budgeting, taking the form of a Report from a 
Working Committee - the work of which was done largely by PoG. That work and 
report also contributed significantly to PoG's project on planning and budgeting. 
E. An example of how these instruments combine and complement one 
another in major projects. 
1. The example: 
The Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) that recommends the allocation of RSA 
revenues between the national, the provincial and local governments. 
2. We sought an invitation to appear before the FFC at its first meeting in 1994 and told 
them how Canada's fiscal arrangements might be helpful to them (Instrument # 5 - the 
presence in South Africa of PoG's Special Advisors). 
3. AW Johnson was invited as one of 6 or 7 foreign experts to attend a conference to do an 
assessment of the FFC's first draft formulae for allocating revenues (Again, Instrument # 
5). 
4. Throughout the whole period - from 1994 on to 1999, PoG's Special Advisors met with 
individual members of the Commission and its Chief Executive Officer, and with 
(mostly) provincial people about the system and the methods for dividing revenues 
(Instrument # 1, Networking). 
5. PoG organized a week-long workshop in Canada on intergovernmental fiscal 
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arrangements. Top Canadians participated (Instrument # 4, Workshop). 
6. PoG brought together Canada's Chief Statistician (plus some colleagues), and the Chair 
and CEO of the FFC to discuss and examine the use of proxy measures of fiscal need, 
part of the South African fiscal arrangements (Instrument # 2, Study visits to Canada). 
7. Chair of FFC and AW Johnson attended South African workshops on Intergovernmental 
Relations (Instrument # 5, Resident PoG advisors). 
8. FFC then requested the long term (1 year) assignment of one of Canada's experts on 
fiscal arrangements to work full time with FFC staff (Instruments # 6, Long duration 
assignment of Canadians to South Africa). 
9. This is a work in Progress and doubtless additional instruments will be used over the rest 
of this process. 
In summary, this presents the character of the PoG, the principles on which it is based, the 
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1. Introduction: Defining and Framing the Issue 
The purpose of this paper is twofold: (i) to undertake a survey of the current literature on 
evaluating governance programmes (Sections 2 & 3 of the paper); and (ii) to provide a brief 
assessment (constraints, implications) of the main governance evaluation approaches and 
instruments (Section 4). But before we proceed to realizing this twofold purpose, it is important 
to define what is meant by "evaluating governance programmes", for this, in turn, will help us fix 
the scope of the task before us. 
All definitions, and the practices implied by them, are contestable and debatable. In the 
case of "evaluation", the debate in the literature arises not so much over its meaning as over its 
practice (i.e. what methodology/approach is to be used in evaluation). The next section of this 
paper is devoted precisely to elucidating this debate. For our immediate purpose though, 
"evaluation" can be defined as an assessment of policies, organizations or programmes aimed at 
improving decision-making, resource allocation and accountability (OECD 1999:6). 
The definitional issue is not quite so straightforward when it comes to "governance". The 
differences and debate among international development agencies' tend to hinge on two factors. 
First, there is the question of whether to include in the definition of governance the influences, 
needs, resources and competencies of both state and civil society. During the 1980s decade of 
"structural adjustment", the tendency (especially of the World Bank and IMF) was to exclude 
civil society; now most international agencies, including the World Bank, invest it with great 
importance. Second, there is the question of the breadth of the definition, that is, whether 
governance involves decision-making in some or all of the multiple "sectors" of development 
(socio-economic, institutional, cultural and environmental sectors). The World Bank and OECD, 
for example, tend to take a more restrictive view (emphasizing decision-making as it applies to 
the first two sectors); the UNDP and CIDA tend to take a broader view (emphasizing decision- 
making as it applies to all sectors) (Johnson/CIDA 1997; WB 1992, 1994; UNDP 1997; 
Kapoor/CIDA 1998)2. One of the most comprehensive definitions, and one we can use as a 
working definition for this paper, is provided by the Institute on Governance: "Governance 
comprises the institutions, processes and traditions which determine how power is exercised, 
how decisions are taken and how citizens have their say" (Johnson 1997: 3; see also Miller 
1996). This definition implies that governance is not a distinct sector of development; it 
intersects all sectors, and as such constitutes a cross-cutting theme (Kapoor & Williams/CIDA 
1999). Governance, moreover, is seen as involving both public sector institutions and citizen 
groups. 
'For a useful comparative analysis of the definition and components of "governance" among donors, see 
Johnson/CIDA 1997. 
z The following short forms will be used for the references within the text: WB=World Bank; EDI=Economic 
Development Institute (of the World Bank), HRCA=Human Rights Council of Australia, 
Comonwealth=Commonwealth Secretariat, DAC=Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD). 
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The various definitions and conceptions of governance just mentioned entail a number of 
governance activities or components. In fact, the recent tendency of many development agencies 
is to include an increasingly wide range of components under "governance". For instance, the 
UNDP and DAC add human rights to their list of governance activities, arguing for the need to 
mainstream human rights in all development activities (UNDP 1997; DAC 1997; see also HRCA 
1995). A survey of what some of the main international development organizations include in 
governance thus yields the following list: public sector management (administrative and financial 
reform, privatization, civil service reform), the rule of law, anti-corruption strategies, 
decentralization, the reduction of military expenditures, participation (by citizens, civil society 
organizations, media, private sector), and human rights (Johnson/CIDA 1997; Kapoor/CIDA 
1998). 
This long list of governance activities would considerably expand and complicate our task 
of surveying and assessing governance evaluation were it not for two restraining factors. On the 
one hand, the field of governance evaluation is relatively new, with most international 
development agencies and governments having limited experience to date. For instance, the 
review of the literature reveals that, within the international development community, only the 
OECD/DAC and World Bank/EDI have begun to examine the field in a systematic way (and 
here, too, mainly in the evaluation of public sector management). Most other agencies, as well as 
governments, have evaluation experience and knowledge in a small number of discrete 
governance-related activities such as capacity development in the civil service, performance 
measurement in human rights programming, or service delivery mechanisms. A similar picture 
emerges from the survey of academic literature: while there is much available on general 
evaluation methodologies and approaches, there is practically nothing on their application to 
governance. Consequently, the task of surveying and assessing governance evaluation in this 
paper must of necessity be tentative and incomplete. 
On the other hand, we are concerned here primarily with the evaluation of governance 
programmes supported by international development organizations such as IDRC and CIDA. 
This programming is necessarily limited (in size and scope), entailing that evaluations have to 
focus, not on a country's overall governance, but on discrete activities within a country's overall 
governance. As a result, the task of evaluating governance does not mean evaluating all 
governance activities at once and comprehensively. Rather, given our purposes here and based on 
the survey of current literature, this paper will take our task to mean two things: (i) examine 
generic approaches/methodologies to evaluation that can be (and are) applied to a range of 
discrete governance programmes ("Evaluation of Governance Programming" covered in Section 
2); and (ii) examine ways of providing discrete support to evaluation within governance: for 
example, by establishing an Auditor General's Office to make the public sector's accounting 
practices more transparent, or establishing public sector service delivery surveys to improve 
government services ("Programming Evaluation In Governance", covered in Section 3). 
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2. Evaluation Q Governance Programming: Generic Approaches and 
Instruments 
(i) From "Blueprint" to Participatory Approaches to Evaluation 
There appears to be a noticeable movement in the literature away from what may be called a 
"blueprint" towards a "participatory" approach to the theory and practice of evaluation. During 
the 1960s and 1970s, evaluation, like the development programming to which it was tied, relied 
primarily on the social science paradigm of its time (Marsden et. al. 1994). Taking its cue from 
the natural sciences, this paradigm argued for a universal, objective reality that could be broken 
down into separate component parts by a "neutral" observer, and then analysed and acted upon 
(Uphoff 1992). The role accorded to evaluation, in this scheme of things, was to find and assess 
conclusive and objective evidence of change through clear cause and effect relationships. 
In the hands of governments and the international development community, the above 
approach to evaluation took on a "technocratic" and "managerial" approach (Guba & Lincoln 
1989: 35ff.; Marsden et. al. 1994: 96ff.). This translated into the need for evaluation to justify 
public spending through cost-benefit analysis, to have short-term horizons dictated by fiscal 
calendars, and to rely heavily on measurable (i.e. quantitative) data. It also meant that, 
frequently, evaluations were indistinguishable from "audits", aimed at ensuring not only financial 
regularity but also that rules, regulations and mandates were being followed (Guilmette 1998). 
Finally, it meant that evaluations could be conducted by "expert" evaluators, who because of 
their informed objectivity, could be external and "independent" to the programme or institution 
being evaluated. 
Gradually, this view of evaluation came under criticism. Of particular concern was its 
tendency to impose "outside" and sometimes irrelevant assessment criteria on programmes under 
the guise of "objectivity". This top-down, "blueprint" approach lent itself to little or no 
accommodation of the diversity and specificity of local values and stakeholders (Guba & Lincoln 
1989; Marsden et. al. 1994). From a developing country perspective, the approach came under 
notably harsh reproach: it was seen as yet another form of Western domination. 
Partly in response to this criticism, partly inspired by the work of such critical theorists as 
Paulo Freire (1970), the 1980s saw the rise of a new, mainly NGO-led approach to the delivery 
and evaluation of development programming (Chambers 1994a, 1994b, 1994c). Reality, under 
this approach, is seen not as universal and objective, but as socially-constructed and ever- 
changing. "Truth", "fact" and "cause-effect" are portrayed as complex and multi-layered, and can 
only be apprehended subjectively (or inter-subjectively). As a result, the role of evaluation 
(developed through "Rapid Rural Appraisal" and "Participatory Rural Appraisal" techniques) is 
to understand and assess change by including the perspectives of all stakeholders. Rather than 
programme managers and outside evaluators unilaterally extracting and categorizing information, 
all programme stakeholders are empowered to engage in defining evaluation procedures and 
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methods through a process of dialogue and group learning. The role of the outside evaluator is to 
act as "catalyst" or "facilitator" of this process. 
Evaluation, in the hand of the participatory approach, is not meant to provide objective or 
definitive answers, but to assess results through dynamic, negotiated consensus. The way in 
which the evaluation is conducted is crucial, so that the exercise is as much a results-assessment 
process as it is a learning and empowering process for all stakeholders. The participatory 
approach is not unconcerned with the issues prioritized by the "blueprint" approach - internal 
rules and procedures, and the efficiency and effectiveness of outputs. What is new is making the 
evaluation process self-reflexive: questions of "why", "how" and "for whom"/"by whom" the 
evaluation is being done are integral to the evaluation, not decided outside or prior to it (ODA 
1994:5). 
(ii) A Participatory Approach to Governance Evaluation 
As pointed out earlier, much of the literature surveyed for this paper recognizes (implicitly 
or explicitly) that the participatory approach to evaluation is still relatively new, and hence its 
application to governance is newer still. But while the practice of participatory governance 
evaluation is still in its formative years, the international development community appears to 
have adopted, or to be adopting, many of its theoretical and methodological underpinnings. 
An important feature of a participatory approach is that, because it focuses on the process 
of evaluation, its methodology is easily adaptable to programming across the various components 
of governance. The following is a summary of what are seen to be the main features and 
strengths of a participatory approach to evaluating a range of governance activities': 
(a) Participation expands the project/programme information base for governance 
evaluation. Identifying, defining and measuring results hinges on comprehensive information 
collection. Bringing together all project/programme stakeholders° can help ensure that: 
a full and wide variety of information and knowledge held by stakeholders is 
identified, coordinated/linked; 
information on, and interests of, a diverse range of social groups, including 
disadvantaged or marginalized social groups (women, children, disabled people, 
aboriginal peoples, religious/cultural minorities, etc.), are integrated; 
quantitative information is complemented by qualitative information and descriptive 
' This summary is based on the following sources: OECD 1999; DAC 1993, 1997; WB 1994, 1995, 1996; 
Roper/Oxfam 1998; Chambers 1994a, 1994b, 1994c; GTZ 1991; LJNDP 1996; HRCA 1995; ODA 1994; Stolz & 
Lanting 1991; Zarzueta/WRI 1995; Armstrong/IDRC 1998; Brown/CIDA 1995; Kapoor/CIDA 1996, 1997. 
^ Stakeholders usually include some or all of the following: the external fenders, the programme managers, the 
programme executing agency, the programme beneficiaries/organizational staff/clients, and any other 
group/organization/donor that may be indirectly affected or concerned by the programme. 
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statements, based on stakeholders' perceptions and judgements; the use of 
stakeholders'/clients' subjective assessment of change before, through and after the 
programme can help do away with the need to commission "baseline studies"; and 
local knowledge and creativity, including "home grown" cultural and sociol-political 
practices and institutions, are incorporated. 
(b) Participation clarifies and stabilises channels of communication and power dynamics for 
governance evaluations. The inclusion of all relevant actors in the programme management 
and evaluation process means that the full range of stakeholders' needs, values and interests 
can be identified and discussed. Dialogue between stakeholders helps iron out, or at least 
acknowledge, differences and disagreements. This makes channels of communication more 
transparent and controlled, and minimises uncertainty, mystification, miscommunication and 
misinterpretation of evaluation criteria, contents, purposes and results. 
(c) Participation creates an iterative environment for decision-making on performance. 
Increasingly complex and uncertain programme environments mean that programme 
objectives and resource allocation needs are seldom always clear. However, 
especially in the case of mid-programme evaluations, as information and 
knowledge change, management/stakeholders can make decisions and allocate or 
re-allocate resources when and where necessary to ensure project sustainability 
and achieve better results; 
better information means that management/stakeholders can better assess risks, or 
re-formulate programme objectives in light of new risks; and 
an iterative environment ensures the sound selection and purpose of evaluation 
criteria and indicators by allowing stakeholders to collectively tailor assessment 
information to their particular needs and interests; as a result of such an 
integration into programming, the usefulness and impact of evaluations is 
heightened (much of the literature points out that the lack of this integration is 
what explains the lack of usefulness and impact of evaluations in the past); 
(d) Participation builds ownership, commitment and accountability: 
if project managers and stakeholders are not included in the design and 
identification of results, they cannot be expected to feel responsible, or be held 
responsible, for project performance; if they are included, they tend to "buy into" 
the project and feel empowered and accountable to reaching project objectives; 
these actions, in turn, help spurn team-building, joint-problem-solving and local 
(developing country) management capacity; and 
open communication helps clarify roles and responsibilities among all 
stakeholders before, during and after an evaluation; and consensus- building 
means that all stakeholders, not just some (funders, managers or executing 
agencies) share accountability; this, in turn, helps all stakeholders to avoid being 
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overly conservative and risk-averse for fear of having to bear all risks and 
accountability. 
(iii) Participatory Governance Evaluation Instruments 
Based on the survey of the literature, none of the agencies using a participatory approach 
to governance programming and evaluation seem to have developed instruments for this purpose 
in any systematic way. The following are three distinct (although not mutually-exclusive) 
instruments that are identified as relevant or useful to governance evaluation. Each adheres, in 
some way or another, to the approach and dimensions of participatory evaluation listed in the last 
two sections. 
(a) Participatory governance evaluations' 
Participatory governance evaluations follow the same modalities as generic participatory 
evaluations. The idea is to involve all stakeholders in the design, development and 
implementation of the evaluation. These evaluations can be carried out either mid-stream 
(formative evaluation) or at the end of a project (summative evaluation). They can be applied to a 
range of activities - governance-related training, capacity building, or policy-making. The 
evaluator(s) is usually external to the programme or institution being evaluated. But the 
evaluator(s) can also be specialized staff of a partner organization with which the governance 
programme or institution has been twinned. Institutional twinning arrangements and partnerships 
underscore the iterative dimension of participatory evaluations, making them a truly 
collaborative process through which both organizations learn and evaluate one another. 
The evaluator's role is to facilitate and coordinate the evaluation process. This role can be 
more or less pro-active, depending on the purpose of the evaluation: if the purpose is to help 
improve transparency and accountability within the organization/programme or provide 
new/technical/specialized perspectives, the evaluator takes on a more interventionist role (but 
still with the consensus of all stakeholders); if the purpose is to increase organizational learning 
or improve implementation and resource allocation, the evaluator takes on a less interventionist 
role, involving stakeholders to a greater extent. 
The most common technique used here is the "stakeholder evaluation workshop". This 
brings together all relevant stakeholders (or stakeholder representatives or focus groups) for 2-3 
day sessions, in which participants collectively design the evaluation (establish the rules of the 
game and the working relationships) and/or assess the programme using both quantitative and 
qualitative information. "Stakeholder analyses" can help identify appropriate stakeholders for the 
workshops. Two other techniques that can be used, usually to complement the evaluation 
5 This subsection is based mainly on the following sources: Roper/Oxfam 1998; Chambers 1994b; " 1996, 1995; 
OECD 1999, 1997: 90ff.; GTZ 1991; Salmen 1992; Armstrong/IDRC 1998. 
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workshop, include: "beneficiary assessments", undertaken to carry out a systematic investigation 
of particular stakeholders (women, minorities, policy managers, etc.) to ensure their concerns and 
assessments are heard and incorporated into the evaluation; and "systematic client consultations", 
which survey programme clients and incorporate their feedback into programming and 
evaluation. 
(b) Self-Assessments' 
Rather than resorting to evaluations conducted by external evaluators, governance 
organizations and programme stakeholders can assess themselves. Here, the organization and 
stakeholders become full participants, and by emphasizing local knowledge and empowerment, 
the evaluation is completely decentralized. Self-assessment teams within the 
organization/programme are usually formed to guide the process both strategically and 
operationally. 
To facilitate self-assessments, external funders can provide training to relevant 
stakeholders and/or develop manuals/"toolboxes" (see Lusthaus et.al./IDRC 1999). During the 
actual assessment, external funders can take part as observers in the assessment process, or can 
remain out of the process completely, relying on the results of the self-assessments once they are 
completed. 
Self-assessments can be used for a number of reasons: to understand and improve 
performance (efficiency and effectiveness of programme delivery, finance, staffing, etc.), to carry 
out strategic planning, or to evaluate organizational strengths and weaknesses. They can be full- 
scale assessments (for strategic planning), but lend themselves well to conducting smaller, issue- 
based evaluations (staff training, gender equity, budgeting, service delivery, etc.). 
(c) Participatory Development of Governance Performance Indicators' 
Performance indicators monitor a programme's performance against expected results. They 
can, and are, used in evaluations such as those described in (a) and (c) above. However, here, they are 
integrated into governance programming from the start. The participatory development of 
governance performance indicators involves all programme stakeholders in the design, development 
and monitoring of expected results throughout the programme (i.e. from inception to implementation 
to close of the programme). Thus, planning, decision-making, implementation and evaluation are all 
linked. 
' This sub-section is a survey of issues raised in the following main sources: Lusthaus et.al./IDRC 1999, 1995; 
Chambers 1994b; Commonwealth 1996; Roper/Oxfam 1998; Dia/WB 1993; WB 1994, 1995. 
' This sub-section is a survey of issues raised in the following main sources: CIDA 1996a, 1996b; Brown/CIDA 1995; 
Kapoor/CIDA 1997a, 1997b, 1998; Lusthaus et.al./IDRC 1998; IDRC 1996,1997; USAID 1998, DAC 1995; Hood/EDl 
1995; Cummings 1997. 
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Using this instrument means that indicators are continuously integrated into the project 
management process; they monitor change on a regular basis and at every stage of programme 
development. Participatory evaluations and self-assessments (a and b above), on the other hand, 
provide a "snapshot" assessment of the project, usually only after a time period has elapsed since the 
programme launch (ex-post). This is not to say, however, that (a) and (b) above and the participatory 
development of indicators are not complementary: data from a mid-term programme evaluation, for 
example, could be used for performance monitoring purposes, although such data would have only 
provisional validity. Similarly, as pointed out above, indicators can be deployed as measurement tools 
within participatory evaluations and self-assessments. 
The main technique used to develop performance indicators is once again a stakeholder 
workshop of the type described in (a) above. The purpose of the workshop is to develop the 
programme objectives, activities and indicators (quantitative and qualitative) against which progress 
towards objectives will be monitored and measured. A useful planning tool sometimes used in this 
exercise (by CIDA, World Bank) is the logical framework (LF/LFA), an analytical planning tool that 
clarifies the logic and linkages through time between a programme's inputs (resources), outputs 
(immediate results), outcomes (short-term results and narrower effects of the programme) and 
impacts (longer-term results and broader effects). Stakeholders collaboratively develop performance 
indicators for each of the programme levels of the LFA, and monitor/assess results periodically 
throughout the programme cycle. Consequently, results are custom-designed by all stakeholders for 
each programme, indicators can be revised when necessary in a flexible manner, and stakeholders can 
learn from mistakes and successes. 
3. Programming Evaluation in Governance: Some Recent Instruments 
While the previous section examined approaches and instruments to evaluate governance 
programming, this section examines ways of programming evaluation within governance that are 
suggested in the literature. What is peculiar to this type of programming is that it is an attempt to 
make a country's governance structures and institutions self-evaluating. Governance institutions 
are provided with the capacity to monitor themselves, at least in some areas, or separate 
institutions are created to act as checks and balances to abuse of public resources and power. 
Thus, programming is used to address a range of governance evaluation issues -- from 
transparency (e.g. anti-corruption activities) to efficiency (e.g. establishment of an auditor 
general's office, civil service reform, service delivery mechanisms) to accountability (e.g. rule of 
law, ombudsman offices, civil society participation). From the point of view of international 
donors, all of these activities can be supported individually, with each discrete activity 
contributing in some measure to a country's capacity to evaluate its governance. 
The range of activities below is far from comprehensive, that is, it does not cover all 
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possible ways of programming evaluation into governance'. Rather, it represents some of the 
current trends (not listed in order of priority) in the international development community. Where 
underlined in the literature, some of the weaknesses and constraints of each activity are pointed 
out. Several activities are inter-related, and many have cross-cutting themes such as 
institutional/capacity building. 
(i) Financial Instruments9 
A number of institutions can be established or strengthened to monitor the public sector's 
accounting/budgeting/expenditure management, performance and probity, but also to set wider 
performance, evaluation, efficiency and accountability standards and procedures. These 
institutions can range from various types of Auditor General's Offices (to carry out 
internal/external audits or financial/management audits) to Courts of Accounts (to promote 
government financial accountability). Key ingredients for the effectiveness of such institutions 
are the provision of financial self-sufficiency (security against political retaliation), political 
independence (protection from political interference) and legal authority (power to prosecute all 
offenders). 
(ii) Civil Servants' Performance Mechanisms' 0 
To increase the efficiency and creativity of civil servants, performance incentives and 
sanctions can be established. Here, rewards and penalties (for high/poor performance) are 
fulfilled through pay and career advances. The literature points out that, for this mechanisms to 
work well, rewards and penalties must be clearly linked to pay and promotion, and staff 
performance works best when tasks and quality expected are not imposed but mutually-agreed 
upon between manager and employee. 
(iii) Decentralization" 
Decentralization is meant to increase government accountability and responsiveness by 
changing the balance of power from central to local/regional authorities and by allowing for 
greater civil society/community participation in state planning and decision-making. It can take 
many forms: administrative "deconcentration" that shifts workloads from central to local 
authorities; transfer of responsibilities to local levels to implement sectoral programmes; transfer 
of political authority to local levels; and economic decentralization, giving local government 
greater autonomy over resource collection (taxation) and spending. While promising, 
e Although the current literature does not suggest it, deficit-cutting, public service downsizing and lay-offs, and 
privatization could conceivably also be added to the list of activities below, since, from an extreme "structural 
adjustment" perspective, they are (arguably) also ways of making governance more efficient. 
9 See Nunberg 1999; DAC 1993; Commonwealth 1996; Sheldon 1996. 
10 See Nunberg 1999; DAC 1997; Commonwealth 1996. 
" See DAC 1997; Kapoor/CIDA 1995, 1998. 
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decentralization has, more often than not, been unsuccessful. Several reasons are given here: 
failure of the centre to delegate real power (economic or political); inadequate local capacity to 
plan, manage or deliver programmes; local government paralysis arising out of inter- 
community/ethnic/religious competition for scarce resources; and lack of clarity in defining local 
responsibilities. 
(iv) Service Delivery Mechanisms12 
Service delivery mechanisms are an increasingly popular instrument for decentralization. 
They are intended to do two things: (a) make public services (health, education, garbage 
collection, etc.) more efficient, competitive, qualitative and responsive by designing and 
delivering services around clients/users/citizens; and (b) decentralize government by giving local 
public service managers greater freedom to manage the delivery of services within the purview 
of government policy guidelines and resources. Once public services are decentralized, managers 
can use a number of techniques to make services competitive and user-friendly: the use of "client 
surveys" can help provide user feedback on whether local providers are effective, competitive, 
timely, accessible, etc.; and "benchmarking" can motivate local providers by comparing their 
performance to other similar providers or setting/monitoring standards of performance. The 
literature on service delivery surveyed for this paper points out that, like most decentralized 
mechanisms, a lingering problem is the lack of integration of local performance results and 
information into centralized planning, decision-making and resource allocation. 
(v) Anti-Corruption Measures13 
In recent years, the World Bank/EDI, in collaboration with Transparency International, 
have spearheaded programming in anti-corruption as a way of increasing accountability and 
transparency in governance. Unlike the traditional approach to this issue, which tended to take a 
top-down, moralizing approach that made corruption the sole responsibility of governments, the 
gist here is to tackle the issue on many fronts and to involve a range of actors, all of whom are 
seen as part of the problem and the solution: 
(a) in the public sector: clarify public sector rules and regulations covering 
recruitment/employment; modify incentive and performance structures (reform pay and 
promotion practices); establish administrative controls (clear administrative procedures 
covering procurement, transparent contracting rules and procedures, auditing offices); 
enact a code of ethics and legal provisions against corruption; create anti-corruption 
offices and ombudsmen; and improve procedures covering the embezzlement and 
Rmgibility of donor funds. 
1z See Cowper & Samuels 1998; Dahlberg & Isaacson 1998; OECD 1996; DAC 1997; Armstrong/IDRC 1998; 
Treasury Board 1998a; Langseth/EDI 1995; Commonwealth 1996. 
" See Kato et. al./EDI 1996; Transparency International 1996; Williams/USAID 1996; Kapoor/CIDA 1998. 
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(b) by civil society: strengthen civil society organizations to monitor the practices of not 
only the public sector, but the private sector and donors as well, and to demand that these 
activities be honest, efficient and transparent. 
(c) through cooperation and dialogue between the public sector, private sector (domestic 
and foreign), civil society organizations and donors aimed at joint anti-corruption 
measures. 
(vi) The Rule of Law14 
The rule of law is the cornerstone of governance accountability. Programming in this area 
aims at building legal foundations (constitution, legislation) and legal institutions (legal capacity, 
law enforcement). The former includes strengthening civil law/common law traditions and 
establishing the full range of human rights protections, civil and political rights (including 
freedom of expression and association), and socio-economic rights (including gender rights). The 
latter ranges from upper/lower court systems, police forces, ombudsman offices (for human 
rights protection, anti-corruption activities, etc.), to constitutional and administrative courts (to 
protect fundamental rights, guarantee separation of powers, resolve conflicts among public sector 
organs and between the public administration and citizens, etc.). 
(vii) Public Participation15 
Increased public participation can contribute to governance accountability. The more 
participatory the public sector, the more politically legitimate and responsive it can become. 
Public participation can increase a country's capacity to govern by allowing the state to embrace 
the organizational talents and resources of civil society organizations (for better planning, service 
delivery, etc.). And civil society can act as a counterweight to the power of government, not only 
behaving as a negative check, but also helping to sustain political interest in governmental 
reform. 
Public participation is not, of course, an easy feat to accomplish. It requires several 
important ingredients, not the least of which are political will, and the public sector knowledge, 
capacity and resources to manage and implement partnerships with civil society. 
See DANIDA 1996; Nunberg 1999; DAC 1997. 
15 See DAC 1997; Plumptre 1992; Uphoff 1992; Kapoor/CIDA 1995. 
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4. Constraints and Implications of Governance Evaluation 
There are several constraints and implications regarding the approaches to, and 
instruments of, governance evaluation and their adoption by development practitioners. Some of 
these constraints and implications are implicit in the above analysis and literature review, and 
hence this section will attempt to make them explicit; others are made explicit in the literature 
itself, others still, will remain unresolved and subject to further reflection and experience. 
(i) The Transition from "Blueprint" to Participatory Approaches to Governance 
Evaluation 
Just because there seems to be a transition within the international development 
community towards the adoption of participatory approaches to evaluation (or to governance 
evaluation) does not mean that this transition is smooth or complete. Several documents point 
out that, while some international development organizations have embraced participatory 
approaches, many (especially within the donor community) are only doing so in stages (DAC 
1997: 28, 103; Brown 1995; Kapoor/CIDA 1996). For example, agencies might use PRA 
techniques in programmes, but they "typically fall short of bringing [stakeholders] fully into the 
evaluation process" (DAC ibid). Much more time and effort are needed, therefore, to better 
integrate ("mainstream") participatory approaches at all levels of policy-making and 
programming and to further develop tools and techniques for its application to governance 
evaluation (DAC 1997:25-6; Found 1997). 
Why the reticence to use participatory approaches? Firstly, probably because, to put it 
colloquially, "old habits die hard": the transition requires nothing less than a change of 
organizational culture, involving less demands for control and "independence" of evaluations 
than before, less emphasis on using only quantitative data, etc. And secondly, probably because 
participatory techniques entail, at least at the outset of programmes, a heavier commitment of 
time and resources (human, institutional and financial) to ensure adequate stakeholder 
involvement. Although not easy, what might be a useful exercise is to carry out a cost-benefit 
analysis comparing traditional vs. participatory methods, although it would be important to be 
able to value (and this is what might be difficult to do) such qualitative participatory elements as 
"long-term sustainability", "empowerment", and "learning". Such an exercise might help sort out 
whether it is effective to adopt participatory approaches and techniques across the board, or 
whether "blueprint" approaches might be useful (expedient?) in some cases (perhaps in the case 
of small and short-term projects?). 
(ii) Evaluating "Governance" or "Discrete Governance Programmes"? 
As was pointed out at the outset of this paper, the peculiarity of governance programming 
from the point of view of international donors is that such programming is discrete and small 
relative to the size and complexity of the recipient country's governance structures and 
institutions. It becomes very difficult, therefore, to evaluate the impact of individual projects on 
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"governance" as a whole (Sutherland 1998: 7, 9, 17). In the case of the evaluation of the 
IDRC/CIDA "Program on Governance", the evaluator, Sharon Sutherland, shares her doubts 
about being able to show evidence of the impact of the project in terms of the "smooth transition 
of the South African Public Service to its new structures and operating methods" (Ibid. 12). 
The main issue here is that the longer the period over which programming stretches and 
the wider the programme scope, the more difficult it is to measure impact with any degree of 
authority. This difficulty lies not only with the small size of donor programmes in relation to the 
bigger picture, but also with the complexity of separating out the effects internal to the project 
and those external to it. Indeed, it often takes a long time to be able to assess the effects of a 
project (often longer than the time span of a project). Moreover, every governance project is 
inevitably influenced by factors over which it has no control, or very little control (these are the 
"risks" of every project): for example, the will/leadership to carry out reform by political elites, 
the relative lack of rule of law or the clientelist practices of civil servants in some countries, etc. 
(see DAC 1997: 7, 11; Dia/WB 1993). Consequently, a governance project might be well 
planned and implemented, but its impact not visible or measurable. What, then, is to be done? 
There are several possibilities: 
because of complex methodological problems mentioned above and of issues of cost- 
ineffectiveness of measuring longer-term and broader impacts, several government 
agencies in New Zealand evaluate only up to the output level of programmes; and 
CIDA's Performance Evaluation Division directs programmes to develop results 
indicators only up to the level of outcome/effectiveness, not impact (Kapoor/CIDA 
1997:10). For programmes wishing impact level evaluations, large multi-donor 
evaluations are suggested as appropriate and more cost-effective. 
governance programmes and evaluations will need to set realistic and appropriate 
objectives/goals/purposes, that is, lower sites and expectations regarding the scope 
and effects of programmes (in terms of time, level of impact, cost-effectiveness, 
efficiency, risks, etc.), and define objectives clearly and consistently (Sutherland 
1998:14; Kapoor 1996). 
greater reliance on the use of qualitative information, using stakeholders' perceptions 
of programme effects and judgments about the appropriateness of evaluation criteria, 
might help better narrow the scope of programming and evaluations. 
(iii) Participatory Approaches 
While section (i) above dealt with some of the donor issues of transition towards 
participatory approaches to governance evaluation, this section examines other constraints and 
implications of the approach from the point of view of both donors and recipients/stakeholders: 
even if participatory approaches to evaluation are adopted by international 
development organizations across the board, the question of "how much 
participation?" remains. Do all governance programmes necessitate the participation 
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of stakeholders in programming and evaluation or just some? Presumably, it would 
not be cost-effective to evaluate small programmes (whether one adopts participatory 
approaches or not). But for those programmes that do require evaluation, how much 
participation is appropriate? Much of the answer here will depend on the 
organization's commitment (in will, ideology, resources) to high degrees of 
participation, where stakeholders are integrated into programming and evaluation, or 
to low degrees, where stakeholders are consulted but not integral to programming 
(DAC 1993, 1997: 23-5, 74, 97; Marsden et. al 1994). 
using a participatory approach to evaluation is not necessarily easy: like it does for the 
donors themselves, if often requires nothing less than changing the organizational 
culture of the recipient organization towards one more conducive to participation. 
This, in turn, means larger and long-term donor commitments. 
there are a number of important risks related to participatory approaches to 
governance: given limited resources, it can be difficult to determine which 
stakeholders to include and exclude from the participatory process; sometimes 
reaching consensus on programme and evaluation objectives and criteria may be 
impossible because of a clash of interests between stakeholders (Lusthaus 
et.al./IDRC:24); sometimes stakeholders are not open to a participatory process: for 
example, civil servants negatively affected by civil service cuts may not wish to be 
part of any evaluation, even though their participation is crucial to measuring 
programme impact (DAC 1997:28). Often these risks are a measure of the extent to 
which all relevant stakeholders are integral to the programming process from the start 
(where differences can more easily be negotiated), with the risks being higher the 
later they join in. 
(iv) Evaluation in Governance 
It should be pointed out that evaluating discrete governance programmes (Section 2 
above) and evaluation in governance (Section 3 above) are not mutually-exclusive. Just because 
programming evaluation in governance (establishing an auditor general's office or the rule of 
law, etc.) allows governance to be self-evaluating, this does not mean that such programming 
does not itself require evaluation. Moreover, while programming evaluation activities within 
governance might in theory help increase a country's overall capacity to be more transparent, 
accountable and efficient, it will be important to get some palpable measure of these in practice. 
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Annex 4 
Evaluating Governance Programs 
8 April 1999 
Tab 3 - Annotated Agenda 
General objectives for the workshop 
There are many definitions of Governance. One of the most comprehensive definitions, and 
the one we will use as a working definition for this discussion, is provided by the Institute on 
Governance: "Governance comprises the institutions, processes and traditions which determine 
how power is exercised, how decisions are taken and how citizens have their say." This 
definition implies that governance is not a distinct sector of development; it affects all sectors, and as 
such constitutes a cross-cutting theme. Governance, moreover, is seen as involving both public sector 
institutions and citizen groups. 
Various definitions and conceptions of governance entail a number of governance activities or 
components. Participants to the workshop should take note that we are concerned here primarily with 
governance programs supported by international development organizations such as IDRC and 
CIDA. This programming is necessarily limited (in size and scope). This means that out discussions 
have to focus on discrete activities, rather than a country's overall governance. As a results, the task 
of evaluating governance does not mean evaluating all governance activities at once and 
comprehensively, but rather evaluating activities or programs in context of a country's needs. 
Theme one: Governance 
What are we trying to achieve when we put in place support for "good governance" programs? 
Introduction: 
Dean Toope will introduce the day by setting the conceptual framework and elaborating on 
the issues at stake when designing Governance activities. Then, Dr Al Johnson, who directed 
IDRC's "Program on Governance" in the Republic of South Africa, will lead off the 
discussion, speaking form practical experience. 
Proposed prompting questions for session one 
1. Governance support is a form of meddling, and is likely to have an impact on a country's 
future: some have argued that this is nothing less than social engineering. Are we fully 
conscious of the dangers resulting from these forays? 
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2. Reality is complex, yet unavoidable (!?) What does practical experience teach us? What are 
the limitations to our good intentions? 
3. How do recipients perceive governance activities? Activity or activism? How do they view: 
- our motivations? 
- our way of doing things? 
- our concern for time, sequencing and pace? 
- our respect for their most fundamental values? 
4. How long does it take to see the effects of the changes on a society? Are we sufficiently 
committed to the long term? Or are we pressured to act quickly? Why? 
Proposed prompting questions for session two 
5. We are accountable for our actions: who is the "owner" and who is the "manager"? Who 
decides what will be done and what should be avoided? Who is the real client of Governance 
support? 
6. To whom are we accountable? Recipients? Or financing agencies? 
7. Or is it the Parliament of Canada and Canadian taxpayers who have the last word? 
Theme Two: Evaluating governance activities 
How can the various actors know if and why they are moving towards the results they want? 
Introduction by: Dr Kapoor, followed by Dr Sutherland. Ms Proctor will lead off the discussions: 
Given our purposes here and based on the survey of current literature, the introduction to our 
discussion will divide our task in two: (i) to examine generic approaches and methodologies 
for evaluation that can be (and are) applied to a range of discrete governance programs; and 
(ii) to examine ways of providing discrete support to evaluation within governance: for 
example, by establishing an Auditor General's Office to make the public sector's accounting 
practices more transparent, or by establishing public sector service delivery surveys to 
improve government services. In the long run, we will need to build the body of knowledge 
which is necessary to understand causal relationships which can be established between 
activities and results. 
Proposed prompting, questions for session three 
8. How do we recognize progress? How do we demonstrate that actions have born results? How 
can we distinguish sustainable progress from fads and non sustainable changes? How do we 
see changes in values and attitudes? 
9. If and when success is recognized, whose success is it? Is it the product of joint activities 
undertaken by foreign technical experts and beneficiary organizations? 
10. When and how do agencies listen those they are meant to help? How do we measure the 
impact of our activities? 
11. How can we "see" and recognize that a crisis has been averted? Do we know if Governance 
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programs have contributed to avoiding crisis and conflict? 
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the mechanisms available for generating and 
applying this knowledge? 
Proposed prompting Questions for session four 
12. How do we ensure that we draw lessons from our mistakes and our successes? 
13. Are lessons transmitted form one expert to another? 
14. Do we really know when we make a mistake? Or when we do good? Have we developed 
effective means and instruments essential to feedback? What indicators of performance have 
we designed to measure effectiveness? 
15. Do we invest what's necessary to ensure the dissemination of knowledge and results? 
16. How do we report? Are successes and failures well documented and circulated? Is success 
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